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Introduction
In Italy, recent defaults by two major corporations have led to a fierce debate about the role of rating agencies. One view points out that regulators could rely on ratings as an instrument of information and protection of small investors; an alternative view underlines that rating agencies move slowly and therefore that the information content of their judgements is poor.
Beyond the domestic issues, investigation of the information content of ratings is a central topic to all financial market regulators. Recall, for instance, the central role assigned to the external ratings by the New Capital Accord in the calculation of banks' regulatory capital under the so called standardised approach.
While the information efficiency of ratings has been extensively analysed with reference to the U.S. markets, little evidence is available for European countries and no study focuses specifically on the Italian case. Therefore, the assessment of the price impact of rating actions for a particular European country, such as Italy, may be a useful sensitivity check to the earlier research mainly based on U.S. data. Moreover, it may provide insights for financial markets authorities involved in the evaluation of the usage of the external ratings as a regulatory tool.
This paper assesses the impact on stock prices of rating changes for a sample of 299 rating actions involving Italian listed companies and announced from the 1 st of January 1991 till the 31 st of August 2003. Rating changes include both upgrades and downgrades, as well as positive and negative credit watches. Abnormal returns for stock prices are estimated, controlling for the anticipations through watches, press speculations or corporate disclosure, the sector of the rated firm, the reason which prompted the rating action.
Consistently with the previous empirical evidence, results show that weak negative abnormal returns are associated with downgrades in the event window ranging from the day before till the day after the announcement; as far as concerns upgrades, significant positive abnormal returns arise after the rating change, thus signalling a delay in the market reaction to positive news. In both cases, no preannouncement effect is detected. Rating changes preceded by watches or outlooks lead to a greater price impact than unexpected ones. Similarly, announcements preceded by contaminating information result in higher abnormal returns: this might provide evidence that the stock price reaction is mainly due to the contaminating information rather than to the rating action itself. Both the sector of the rated entity and the reason of the rating changes seem to matter only for downgrades: due to sample size issues, however, this evidence may not be regarded as conclusive.
Additions to the watch list (both positive and negative) were analysed as a separate sample of rating actions: the results are similar to the evidence collected for the sample of upgrades and downgrades.
The work is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the conclusions of the previous literature on the impact of rating actions; section 3 posits a few questions which are to be investigated in the paper; the following paragraph describes the data and the methodology used; section 5 comments the results; conclusions follow.
Previous Empirical Studies
The information content of ratings can be examined by focusing on the stock and bond price impact of rating changes. If agencies act on the basis of information which is not already in the public domain, we would expect to find significant abnormal returns associated with rating changes (as computed with reference to the day of the announcement or to a [-1, +1] event window). Testing for abnormal returns over longer pre-and post-announcement periods may also be very useful: detection of a pre-announcement effect, for instance, support the conclusion that agencies merely react to news already embedded in market prices.
Early studies on the effect of rating changes, using either monthly or daily data for the U.S.
bond market, found either mixed evidence (Pinches and Singleton, 1978) or no impact at all (Weinstein, 1977; Wakeman, 1978) . These results mainly reflected the fact that most of the rating actions followed the occurrence of publicly known events. Recent researches refine the methodology by breaking down the rating actions into different subgroups according to whether they were preceded by a credit watch in the same direction and/or by contaminating information. Hand et al. (1992) , among the others, find out that only negative watches and downgrades lead to a significant effect on both bond and stock prices and that non contaminated samples exhibit stronger reactions. Goh and Ederington (1993) argue that downgrades may have a different impact on stock prices depending on the reason which led to an increase in the firm's risk and, in particular, on whether such an increase corresponds to a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders.
The authors actually find a significant negative market reaction only to downgrades due to a deterioration of firm's financial prospects (having negative implications for stockholders). Dichev and Piotroski (2001) check also for post-announcement drift by investigating the price impact along a three-year horizon. Downgrades and upgrades are broken up into two subsamples depending on whether they relate to holding or subsidiaries. The results show that only downgrades matter: they exhibit a post-announcement effect which lasts at least one year and is more pronounced for holdings, small firms and lower rated entities. Vassalou and Xing (2003) explain the asymmetric reaction of market prices to rating actions as stemming from the pattern of the underlying default likelihood probability. This index would move sharply only before downgrade announcements (by rising before and gradually decreasing in the following years), while it would follow a less pronounced pattern before upgrades. Moreover, the authors argue that the ranking of the firms resulting from rating can be easily replicated by using indicators such as dimension or book to market value: therefore, the information content of ratings would be poor.
A stream of the literature investigates the impact of rating changes specifically for banks 1 . Schweitzer et al. (1992) test the null hypothesis that rating actions matter less for banks than for corporates, the idea being that since banks are highly regulated entities the amount of information available to the market might be higher and hence the information content of rating actions might be lower. The alternative hypothesis (i.e. rating actions matter more for banks) is based on the idea that regulators might allow withholding of adverse information in view of the preservation of the stability of the banking system, therefore leading to more pronounced abnormal returns associated with unfavourable bank rating actions. In fact, the empirical evidence shows that downgrades lead to a stronger effect when involving banks, thus lending support to the second hypothesis. Gropp and Richards (2001) assess the impact of rating changes on stock and bond prices for a sample of European banks. They find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, while for stock prices strong effects are associated only with unanticipated rating changes; moreover, the underlying reason seems to matter for the subsample of downgrades.
The implications of the empirical evidence on the information content of ratings for the role of rating agencies in financial markets is not unambiguous. A few authors argue that, notwithstanding the mixed evidence, rating agencies may perform a useful function in summarising and providing information at least to stockholders. According to this view, rating agencies produce valuable complementary information. As a side effect, this would provide a useful tool for market discipline, improving the corporate governance of the rated entities.
The Hypotheses to Be Tested
Following the literature recalled above, the information content of the rating actions will be investigated by controlling for the direction of the changes, their anticipation either through a watch or an outlook in the same direction, their contamination either by news stories and/or the release of information by the issuer, the reason of the change and the sector of the issuer.
In particular, the hypotheses to be tested are the following. First, the rating actions may produce a different impact on stock prices according to whether they are upgrades, downgrades or watches. Rating changes are therefore broken into two subsamples: that of actual downgrades and upgrades and that of additions to the watch list. Within each subgroup, the hypothesis to be tested is whether stock prices react differently to downgrades versus upgrades (and similarly whether stock prices react differently to negative versus positive watches).
Second, announced changes, either by a watch or an outlook notice, might impact less than unanticipated ones. Hence it will be investigated whether stock prices react differently to announced downgrades/upgrades versus unanticipated rating actions (and similarly for the additions to the watch list).
Contaminating news, either as a press speculation or a corporate disclosure of the event prompting the rating action, might bias upward the impact of the rating action itself. The market reaction might in fact be due to the concurrent release of information rather than to the rating change. Excluding contaminated observations, however, might be inappropriate especially if the firm's disclosure is prompted by the expectation of a rating action. Hence, it is convenient to distinguish between contaminated and uncontaminated observations. The third hypothesis is, therefore, that stock prices react differently to contaminated versus uncontaminated rating actions (watches).
The impact of the rating action might also be affected by the sector of the issuer: therefore, it is interesting to split observations according to whether they refer to a financial firm or to an industrial firm. As recalled above, this might be true if different regulatory regimes (designed respectively for financial and non financial issuers) imply different degrees of transparency. It will hence be checked whether the stock price reaction is affected by the sector of the issuer involved in the rating action.
Finally, the explanation of the rating changes might be relevant: a differential impact might arise depending on whether the underlying reason is a change in the firm's earnings or in the firm's leverage. In particular, following Goh and Ederington (1993) , observations are split into three groups: the first including an improvement/deterioration of the firm's earnings, financial prospects and cash flows which might be due either to firm's specific events or to institutional/macroeconomic factors; the second linked to events which change the firm's leverage, such as mergers and acquisitions; the third including miscellaneous reasons.
Data and Methodology

The Data
The data set includes 299 rating actions performed in the period 1 st January 1991 -31 provided by the rating agencies websites. The Bloomberg database was also used to check whether the rating change announcement followed the public disclosure of the corporate event underlying the agency's action.
The analysis concentrates on long term issuer ratings, that is on the agencies' opinion of an obligor's overall financial capacity to pay its financial obligations. Moreover, the analysis focuses on the effect on stock rather than bond prices for two reasons. First, for most of the firms only the issuer rating is available; therefore, selecting only issue ratings would have severely restricted the sample size. Secondly, regardless of the sample size, it is well known that the Italian bond market is thin and illiquid; considering bond ratings might have implied incurring in a poor data quality problem.
Rating actions are distributed as follows: Among the downgrades, 7 rating actions shifted the rated entity from the investment grade to the speculative category; among the upgrades, the category change took place just once. In 57 cases (corresponding to 26 rating changes), the action was undertaken by two or more agencies within a time span no longer than one week: apart from one circumstance, rating changes are always converging (that is, they moved in the same direction). Finally, agencies changed ratings by two notches at most in almost all the cases. Most of the rating actions involve banks (200 against the 30 concerning insurance companies and the 69 concerning industrial firms); this distribution reflects the fact that the majority of the rated entities are banks.
The breakdown of the rating actions by year shows that the frequency of the rating changes increased greatly over time, simultaneously with the increase of the number of rated entities 
The Methodology
Abnormal returns associated with rating actions are computed through the application of the standard Event Study Methodology. After setting the announcement day as day 0, a market model is run using the window [-260, -21] as the estimation period, according to the following specification:
where R it is the log return of the stock i at time t, R M is the log return of the market portfolio M at time t. 5 The estimated parameters are used to compute the abnormal returns in the event window [-20, + 20 ] :
After averaging the it AR across events in order to get the average abnormal returns ( it AAR ), cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the window [t, T] are defined as:
The following tables will report CARs for the windows [-20, - 
Results
In the following, results of the estimation of abnormal returns are reported for both the subsample of upgrades/downgrades and the subsample including watches only.
Upgrades and Downgrades
Results in Tabb. 3 and 4 allow to answer positively to the first hypothesis to be investigated:
upgrades and downgrades affect differently stock prices and such difference is statistically significant. The abnormal returns (AAR) on rating change announcement on day 0 (the event day) and on day 1 are reported in Tab. 3. Interestingly, the AAR on the event day are always statistically insignificant, while on day 1 they turn out to be significantly different from zero for both downgrades and upgrades when the whole sample is considered (equal respectively to -0.47 and +0.51%). As far as concerns the breakdown of anticipated versus unanticipated rating changes, the AAR are significantly different from zero at day 1 only for the sample of the rating actions which were preceded by a credit watch in the same direction (-0.59% for the subsample of downgrades and +0.75% for the sample of upgrades; see Tab show that within the downgrades due to a deterioration of the firm's earning prospects CARs are greater (and statistically significant) only for the group of unanticipated rating actions.
Apart from this check, it is worth noticing that the significance of the abnormal returns of announced rating changes only may be explained by the fact that most of the anticipated rating actions (more precisely, 100 out of 143) are also contaminated by a concurrent disclosure, which might have driven the results.
The impact of the concurrent release of information clearly stems out from the comparison between contaminated and uncontaminated subsamples: almost always, both downgrades and As to the reason of the rating action, it seems to matter only for downgrades given that the abnormal negative returns are statistically significant for the "mergers and acquisitions" subsample ( -1.07% in the window [-1, +1]; see Tab. 5). It is important to recall that this subsample mainly includes contaminated rating actions: therefore, the price reaction might be led primarily by the concurring disclosure of the event prompting the rating change.
Rating Watches
As mentioned above, rating watches are used not only to discriminate between anticipated and unanticipated rating actions but also as events themselves. The analysis described in the previous paragraph was therefore replicated for the sample of the additions to the watch list (Tab. 6). In particular, only negative rating watch exhibit a significant Car[-1, +1] (equal to -1.34%; see Tab. 6); moreover negative watches which are preceded by concurring information are associated with a higher price impact (about -2.7% against -1.5% for the uncontaminated subsample). Again, this latter result might strengthen the inference that stock prices react basically to the public announcement of the event underlying the rating action rather than to the rating change itself. Given the small sample size of the contaminated events (namely, 19 events), however, this conclusion might not be regarded as robust. Moreover, given that a statistically and quantitatively significant Car [-1, +1 ] is recorded also for the uncontaminated subsample, negative watches might be regarded as conveying information to the market in any case.
Finally, it is worth noticing that within the sample of agencies' actions implying bad news for the rated firms, stock prices seem to react more to negative watches than to downgrades.
Conclusions
The analysis of the effects on stock prices of rating actions for a sample of 299 rating changes by Fitch, Moody's and Standard&Poor's involving Italian firms showed that, overall, stock price reactions to rating change announcements are quite moderate or statistically insignificant. The market acknowledges an information content only to downgrades and additions to the negative credit watch list. If any, the abnormal returns seem to be driven mainly by concurrent disclosure concerning the reason underlying the rating action.
Overall, rating agencies do not seem to act on the basis of private information. This evidence, although corroborating the hypothesis that rating agencies act in line with the financial market regulation prohibiting selective disclosure of significant corporate events, supports the argument that the information content of ratings is modest.
The absence of pre-announcement abnormal returns, even for the contaminated subsample, however, might be an indirect evidence of a timely action of the rating agencies when they move on the basis of a news which is already in the public domain. It is worth noticing, moreover, that the events prompting the rating change are probably only those affecting the estimate the borrowers' condition at the worst point in an economic or industry cycle; therefore, rating changes should take place only when firms' long term conditions are muted (Treacy and Carey, 1998) . This might explain why ratings are not as volatile as stock prices,
given that these latter may reflect also short term investors' strategies.
On policy grounds, the evidence on the information content of ratings suggest that they cannot be used as a tool of timely information and protection of small investors. Notwithstanding the role that they can play as a summary indicator of an issuer's conditions, the protection of retail investors has to be pursued through different instruments, such as disclosure obligations for firms and rules of business conduct for intermediaries.
In the following, estimation results based on the market adjusted model are reported. 
